Abstract. A nominative signature scheme allows a nominator (i.e. the signer) and a nominee (i.e. a designated verifier) to jointly generate and publish a signature so that only the nominee can check the validity of a nominative signature and further convince a third party to accept this fact. Recently, Huang and Wang proposed a new nominative signature scheme at ACISP 2004, and claimed that their scheme is secure under some standard computational assumptions. In this paper, we show that their scheme is not a secure nominative signature, since it fails to meet the crucial security requirement of verification untransferability. Specifically, we present an adaptively chosen-message attack against their scheme such that the nominator can determine the validity of a new message-signature pair with some indirect help from the nominee. Moreover, we point out that this attack enables the nominator to demonstrate the validity of nominative signatures to a third party. Therefore, the Huang-Wang scheme does not meet confirmation/disavowal untransferability either.
Introduction
As an important primitive in modern cryptography, digital signatures are widely used to provide integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation for authenticating electronic messages. Standard digital signatures are universally or publicly verifiable. That is, according to a publicly known signature verification algorithm anybody can check whether an alleged signature-message pair is valid or not with respect to a given public key. However, this may not be a desired property in some situations, where messages to be authenticated are personally private or commercially sensitive. To restrict the universal verifiability, therefore, some variants of digital signatures have been proposed, such as undeniable signatures (US), designated confirmer signatures (DCS), and nominative signatures (NS).
In undeniable signature schemes [4, 15, 9] , the validity of a signature can only be verified under the cooperation of the signer. Undeniable signatures find various applications, such as licensing softwares, e-cash, e-voting, e-auctions, etc. In [6, 1, 11] , designated confirmer signatures (DCS) are further proposed to guarantee that the validity of signatures can also be verified under the help of a semi-trusted party, called designated confirmer. This is a useful enhancement for verifiers, since they may need to check a signature's validity even in the case the signer is unavailable, due to some subjective or objective reasons.
Compared with these schemes, nominative signatures [14, 13] hand over the power of signature verification to the verifier. That is, without the help of a designated verifier (called nominee), anybody including the signer (called nominator) cannot determine whether an alleged signature-message pair is valid or not. Actually, nominative signatures can be considered as the dual concept of undeniable signatures. In addition, as suggested in [14, 13] , nominative signatures have potential applications in the scenarios where a signed message is personally private or commercially sensitive, such as a tax bill, a medical examination report, an ID certificate, etc.
In 1996, Kim et al. [14] first introduced the concept of nominative signatures. Intuitively, a nominative signature scheme allows a nominator (or signer) and a nominee (or verifier) to jointly generate and publish a signature for an arbitrary message. Different from standard signatures, however, only the nominee (holding his/her own private key) can verify the validity of a published nominative signature. Furthermore, if necessary, the nominee can also convince a third party to accept this fact by proving (in zero-knowledge) that such a signature is indeed issued by a specific nominator.
At ACISP 2004, Huang and Wang [13] mounted an attack showing that Kim et al.'s scheme is not nominative, since the nominator can also verify and prove the validity of a signature to a third party. To avoid this weakness, they further proposed a new nominative signature scheme. Actually, their scheme are also convertible. That is, the nominee can also convert a nominative signature into a publicly verifiable one, if necessary.
Soon, Susilo and Mu [18] claimed that the Huang-Wang scheme is not nominative either. Specifically, they described three deterministic algorithms that allow the nominator alone (i.e., without any help from the nominee) to (a) verify the validity of a nominative signature, (b) convince a third party that the signature is valid, and (c) convert the signature into a publicly verifiable one. However, Guo et al. [12] pointed out that all these attacks are actually invalid. In particular, they showed that there exists no deterministic algorithm allowing the nominator to check the validity of a published nominative signature if the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard. So, it is still not clear whether the Huang-Wang scheme is a truly secure nominative signature against adaptively chosen-message attacks.
In this paper, we present a detailed security analysis of the Huang-Wang scheme [13] and show that it is indeed not a secure nominative signature scheme, since it fails to meet the crucial security requirement: verification untransferability. Specifically, we identify an adaptively chosen-message attack against their scheme such that the nominator can determine the validity of a new messagesignature pair with some indirect help from the nominee. Moreover, we point out that this attack enables the nominator to prove the validity of nominative signatures to a third party. Therefore, the Huang-Wang scheme also does not satisfy the confirmation/disavowal untransferability, which requires that except the nominee anybody should be unable to convince a third party accepting the validity of an alleged signature. In addition, we analyze the reasons why their scheme is insecure. This paper is organized as follows. We first review Huang-Wang scheme in Section 2, and then present our attacks in Section 3. Finally, a brief conclusion is given in Section 4. In [13] , a convertible nominative signature is called secure if it satisfies the following three security requirements: unforgeability, verification untransferability, and confirmation/disavowal untransferability. Unforgeability requires that except the nominator, anybody including the nominee cannot forge a valid nominative signature on behalf of the nominator with non-negligible probability. The essential meaning of verification untransferability is that anybody including the nominator cannot determine the validity of a presumed nominative signature with non-negligible advantage, even if he/she already checked the validity of many other signatures with the nominee. The last requirement means that anybody including the nominator cannot convince a third party to accept the validity or invalidity of a given nominative signature, even if he/she already interacted with the nominee for many times. In the following, we recall the formal definitions of those three security requirement, which are specified in [13] . 
Definition 2 (Unforgeability
Here, the probability is taken over the coin tosses of F , S, V , m and σ. 
Definition 3 (Verification Untransferability
Here, the probability is taken over the coin tosses of A, S, V , m and σ. 
Definition 4 (Confirmation/Disavowal Untransferability
Here, the probability is taken over the coin tosses of A, T , S, V , m and σ.
The Huang-Wang Scheme
We now review the concrete Huang-Wang nominative signature scheme [13] , which works in the discrete logarithm setting. In the following description, notation x ∈ R X means that an element x is uniformly chosen from set X at random, while denote the concatenation of strings. 
If not, output "False". Otherwise, nominee V outputs σ = (b, c, s) as the nominative signature for message m by setting [15] to confirm or disavow the validity of σ via proving log d c = log g y v or log d c = log g y v . Refer to Section 2.2 in [13] for the detail how this proof is conducted interactively. 
Security Remarks on the Huang-Wang Scheme
In [13] , the authors provided some security arguments to show that their nominative signature scheme meets the three desirable security requirements: Unforgeability, verification untransferability, and confirmation/disavowal untransferability. Note that those security arguments are informal explanations instead of formal proofs, so the security of Huang-Wang scheme is not guaranteed in fact: It may be secure or insecure. As pointed out in [13] , it seems that the unforgeability of Huang-Wang scheme is related to that of Schnorr signature [17] . This can be informally explained as follows. Let a PPT algorithm F be a forger, who is given the security parameter 1 n , the nominator S's public key pk s , and the nominee V 's public and private key pair (pk v , sk v ). According to Definition 2, However, Schnorr signature is proved to be unforgeable if the discrete logarithm is hard [16] . So it is likely that Huang-Wang scheme is also unforgeable, though elaborated work is needed to formally prove this result by using the forking lemma proposed in [16] .
For other two security requirements, however, it is another story. In the following sections, we present some direct attacks to show that the Huang-Wang scheme satisfies neither verification untransferability nor confirmation/disavowal untransferability.
Verification Untransferability
In [13] , the authors argued that the Huang-Wang scheme satisfies the verification untransferability, because both of the following two statements hold: [15] is an untransferable zero knowledge proof for proving whether two discrete logarithm is equal or not.
However, we notice that neither of the above two statements are correct (and shall be explained below). Moreover, based on this observation we can mount a concrete attack on the Huang-Wang scheme so that the verification untransferability is violated.
Statement (a) is invalid, because the attacker A can "solve" the DDH problem in this scenario. This is due to the fact that according to Definition 3, an attacker A for verification untransferability is allowed to access DDH oracle by running Conf with nominee V . Actually, using the above fact we identify an concrete attack to show that the Huang-Wang scheme is not verification untransferable. In this attack, we assume the attacker A has the knowledge of nominator S's private key sk s . Note that this is consistent with Definition 3, which formally specified the verification untransferability. In other words, the nominator S is also allowed to be an attacker for this security requirement. Now, we describe the attack in detail. Attack 1. To check whether an alleged nominative signature σ = (b, c, s) is valid for a message m, the attacker A (or the nominator S) can perform as follows.
1.
A first selects another messagem, and two random numbersR 1 ,R 2 ∈ R Z * q . 2. Then, using x s the attacker A can compute a tripleσ = (b,c,s) by 
Now, we return to Statement (b): It is also false, since Michels-Stadler's protocol [15] is not zero-knowledge, as first pointed out by Camenisch and Shoup (See Section 5 of [3] ). Namely, (in our setting) the value of d xv is additionally revealed in the case of log g y v = log d c and the verifier dishonestly selects d such that he knows log g d. This weakness shall naturally affect the formal security of the Huang-Wang scheme, though we do not any find direct attack by using it 1 .
Confirmation/Disavowal Untransferability
According to Definition 4, the confirmation/disavowal untransferability requires that given a presumed message-signature pair (m, σ), any PPT attacker A (including the nominator S but not the nominee V ) cannot convince a third party T to accept the validity or invalidity of this pair (m, σ), where A is allowed to run Conf with V on any string and Conv with V on any string other than the target (m, σ). However, we find out that using Attack 1 against verification untransferability as a subroutine, we can break the confirmation/disavowal untransferability as well. We now briefly present this attack.
Attack 2.
To convince a third party T accepting the validity or invalidity of a target message-signature pair (m, σ), an attacker (who knows the private key x s of the nominator S) can perform as follows.
1. From the given pair (m, σ), the attacker A first creates a new messagesignature pair (m,σ) as in Attack 1 (see Eq. (5)).
After that,
A asks the nominee V to convert (m,σ). Therefore, A can get a non-interactive proofπ that shows whetherσ is a valid signature for messagem. 3. Then, the attacker A forwards (m,σ,π, π ) to the third party T , where π is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof showing thatσ = (b,c,s) is properly generated according to Eq. (5), i.e., A knows that there are two random numbers (R 1 ,R 2 ) so that the following conditions hold simultaneously:
4. Finally, the third party T validates whether π is a correct proof for Eq. Note that using the well-known technique called signature proof of knowledge [2] , it is very easy for A to issue proof π for Eq. (6). Alternatively, A can run an interactive protocol with T to prove that the conditions in Eq.(6) hold. Moreover, during this procedure it is infeasible for T to derive x s since this proof is zero-knowledge.
The correctness of Attack 2 is almost obvious, since (m,σ) and (m, σ) have the same validity or invalidity and the attacker does not ask the nominee V to convert σ at all. Therefore, Attack 2 breaks the confirmation/disavowal untransferability of Huang-Wang scheme. That is, at least for the nominator the Huang-Wang is not confirmation/disavowal untransferable.
Countermeasures
As we mentioned above, the Huang-Wang scheme employs a flawed building block: Michels-Stadler's protocol, which is designed to prove whether or not two discrete logarithms are equal. However, this protocol is not zero-knowledge, contrary to the claims made in [15] . To avoid this weakness, we can choose two truly zero-knowledge protocols from [5] and [3] to prove the equality or inequality of two discrete logarithms, respectively.
Moreover, according to the specification of confirmation/disavowal untransferability (Definition 4), in the setting of nominative signatures one should use concurrent zero-knowledge (CZK) protocols rather than special honest-verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK) protocols [3] . The reason is that an attacker here may act as an arbitrary cheating verifier during the execution of Conf protocol to confirm or disavow an alleged nominative signature. Fortunately, by using the techniques suggested in any of [7, 8, 10] , we can easily transform SHVZK protocols from [5] and [3] to CZK protocols. Using such CZK protocols to confirm or disavow nominative signatures, the confirmation/disavowal untransferability can be guaranteed. Moreover, the formal proofs can be adapted from that given in [1, 11] , where the transcripts of verifying designated confirmer signatures are also required to be untransferable.
However, we do not find any effective countermeasure to prevent Attack 1 at this moment. In fact, we believe this is the essential security flaw of HuangWang nominative signature scheme.
Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a security analysis of the Huang-Wang convertible nominative scheme [13] . According to our results, the Huang-Wang scheme is not secure, since it fails to meet two desirable security requirements: verification untransferability and confirmation/disavowal untransferability. Specifically, we presented two attacks to show that their scheme violates those two security requirements. In fact, those two attacks are due to an essential design flaw in the scheme. In addition, we also remarked that the Huang-Wang scheme employs a flawed zero-knowledge protocol. Moreover, we pointed out the reasons why their scheme is insecure. As the future work, it is interesting to consider how to prevent our Attack 1 against verification untransferability and how to design newly secure nominative signatures.
